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Storymaking across Contexts:
How a Fiction Writer and a Team of
Computer Scientists Came to Terms
In July 2001, a young Australian writer of fiction was asked to help envision the
next generation of intelligent reasoning systems. She was an unlikely candidate.
At the age of 27, she was preoccupied with storytelling, testing her acting abilities
in semi-professional theatre and toying with plots for a science fiction novel. In
search of ideas for future inventions, she attended a conference on ‘Symmetry: Art
and Science’, planning to audit the event for a day. She didn’t realise that a wellfunded systems architect was scouting the forum, looking for novel approaches to
a longstanding problem in computer science.
As the writer listened to the presentations, she saw the problematic relationship
between art and science for the first time (Snow 1993). She experienced a
‘postcolonial moment’ in which ‘disparate knowledge traditions abut and abrade
… stuck fast, in power relations characteristic of colonizing’ (Verran 730). The
scientists displayed artworks and explained how they were measuring them —
Kandinsky, Picasso and Escher were reduced to lines over grids. Used to trusting
their truths, these researchers had not questioned whether their formalisms could
report meaningfully on a different field. When it was time for the artistic delegates
to speak, they did not engage with such metrics. Instead they spoke in poetic
manifestos, many of which just affirmed the ‘non-narrativisable’ nature of their
practice (Spivak 1990 144).
The young fiction writer’s understanding of stories was different from either
of these. Without a paper submission, she asked the organisers whether she could
present. Before the delegates returned to their home countries, she explained how her
story-making tools depended on a structure beneath the semantics (Cardier 2004).
As a result, the writer was invited to participate in a collaborative science
project. She was chosen because her ideas were different from conventional
approaches, but this also increased the challenge of saying anything comprehensible
to her team. Colonial dynamics can exist between fields of research, and it is
common for both the creative arts and science to treat each other as exotic spaces
of fieldwork (Law 98), with one of the many consequences being displaced or
repressed knowledges (Law 148). Given the divergent notions of text, proof and
truth within the new interdisciplinary group, on whose terms should they speak?
If the computer scientists adopted the writer’s terms, their work could not be
implemented in a machine. If the writer tried to express her ideas in relation to
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existing theories of information science, the work would not capture the extra
insights needed. Before the group could collaborate, their disciplinary cultures
had to negotiate shared territory (Devlin 5). Valuable ideas were hovering between
the specialists in a space they could not see.
*****
The aim of the project, named Sheherazade, was to design foundations for a
new sort of knowledge base. A knowledge base is similar to a database except it
stores concepts so they can be assembled and enriched by reasoning systems. For
the non-expert, imagine that instead of a computer providing a user with canned
responses, it gathers clouds of media fragments into tailored answers. A database
just returns what was put in; a knowledge system extends what has been stored.
The usefulness of a system’s output is limited by its knowledge terms.
Think of the terms as the knowledge-about-the-knowledge inside the computer.
Knowledge-about-knowledge is similar to John Law’s notions about creating
models of reality, in which ‘it becomes important to think through modes of
crafting that let us apprehend’ (Law 152). In a knowledge base, this manifests
as a higher level of operation within the system, a knowledge base in itself.
The abilities of current systems suggest that if strong computerised reasoning is
desired, this higher-level system has to be large and complex, perhaps as large as
the knowledge base itself. The Sheherazade project addressed this fundamental
level, wanting to figure out a better way to model the apprehensions on which the
system’s terms would rest.
The cost of neglecting this knowledge-about-knowledge can be illustrated
by describing what is still not possible for knowledge bases. Cancer research
is an interdisciplinary affair, performed by teams. Each participant is an expert
in a unique area, so specialised that the others generally do not understand the
details in depth. These collaborative researchers will puzzle, query, and explain
to each other, and perhaps not make much progress. Mathematics helps, but only
a bit. A key problem is context: each specialist uses the context of a particular
discipline to situate the meaning of her or his statements, but colleagues do not
have access to the same reference points. A new sort of knowledge base could
solve a significant portion of the communication problem, so that every piece
of information under discussion could be transferred into multiple terms. New
connections and insights could emerge. State of the art knowledge representation
schemes, like those used by the US intelligence community and the semantic
web, currently cannot automatically and accurately transfer information between
numerous contexts in this way.
Humans intuitively understand context (Ikris 6). Without consciously
thinking about it, people understand that when the context changes, the meaning
of statements within it also alters. Here is a simple example — a story told by a
two-year-old child:
The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. (Devlin 81)
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This tale can be understood to represent comforted distress. Consider how the
perceived context changes if I add another sentence:
The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. The mommy hit the baby again.

Now the situation could be one of child abuse. In the world as it is experienced there
is always another piece of information coming, and ‘there is never closure’ (Law
132). Humans are able to re-evaluate their assumptions about a situation if new,
conflicting information is received. The Sheherazade project wanted to discover
what sorts of representations would enable a knowledge system to automatically
re-contextualize knowledge, in such a way that new causal connections between
elements might emerge.
We started with the idea that computer systems could manage contexts in
the same manner as stories. Even though a story refers to known imagery and
ideas, it can synthesise these from many different contexts, and in the process
alter them to produce new, unexpected arrangements. The Sheherazade team’s
resident writer began research into a particular aspect of stories: how humans can
maintain an evolving understanding of information, even when its contexts are
changing or disjunctive.
*****
Actually that is not true. At first the writer did not even understand the problem.
Why not just program the computer to add new information to the old? she asked.
The scientists explained that computers could not cope with information that was
‘unexpected’. This is because there is a map inside all systems, known as an ontology.
In computer science, an ontology is a fixed constellation of concepts that defines
the terms used by the system, like a dictionary. The term ontology originally came
from philosophy — there it refers to the nameable aspects of reality (Hofweber
online). In this respect, the computer science notion of ontology is similar to
that of Law, who sees an ontology as a way in which ‘particular realities are
brought into being’ (132). The computer science definition differs, however, in
the specific terms of that representation:
I define ontology as a set of knowledge terms, including the vocabulary, the semantic
interconnections, and some simple rules of inference and logic for some particular
topic. (Hendler 30)

Figure 1 is an example of part of a representation for a low-level ontology
developed for a website that helps travellers find preferred airline seats. The
method of ontological representation informs the reality modelled, both capturing
and producing a situation of conceptual objects and relational links.
Ontological terms are necessarily finite in computer science, so concepts
do get left out. This causes problems for systems and the users who depend on
them. If an unexpected question is asked of an airline database, such as ‘send
Munich to Frankfurt’ (where ‘Munich’ is the soccer team), and the system does
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Fig. 1. Part of an ontology for choosing airline seats (Kanellopoulos 203).

not understand, strange transits could result. The problem gets worse when
two different ontologies try to interact. A simple example: consider the way an
airfare database depends on a relationship between departures, destinations, and
prices (Kanellopoulos 199). If it tries to interact with a system that deals in plane
crashes, the concepts surrounding ‘plane seat’ will likely be different. If one
system understands but the other does not — or worse, thinks it does but does
not, they will likely malfunction. Because each represents a different abstraction
of reality, the relations between concepts differ, even if some of the actual terms
are the same.
Current ontologies cannot change much once they are implemented in a
computer, unlike a human who can learn new ways of thinking. As a consequence, a
knowledge system can only process information if it slides easily into the available
abstractions. Anything else is ‘unexpected’ and so cannot be handled. Ontological
conflict, if managed poorly, diminishes the concepts available for enactment:
… if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you
are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by
the arrangement of those lines. (Spivak 1993 34)

Inadequate context modelling has two implications for the knowledge base
that tries to analyse cancer. First, it cannot synthesise data from many different
sources. Second, even if it could, neither it, nor any application, could propose
new, unexpected therapies. We wanted to make a system that could redraw the
lines over and over. How could we endow our knowledge-about-knowledge with
an understanding of contextual re-interpretation?
*****
Non-Ideal Solutions
Researchers have been trying to formalise contextual re-interpretation since
computers were invented, and have still only partly succeeded. One approach is to
institute a common ontological standard and establish it as universal, applying both
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to context and facts. Apart from whether this is do-able, this assumes one context.
In this homogenisation, every system uses the same, agreed-upon terminology and
logic. For example, the Semantic Web has a common ontology, based on OWL,
the Web Ontology Language. Supporters suppose it could eventually embrace
all the expertise covered on the web, making more accurate searching possible.
The problem is that specialised information is so peculiar to a domain that the
required ontology explodes in size. As a consequence of the expected failure of
this approach, senior researchers in the field have started work on ever higher
and higher meta-ontologies, with the case against the OWL approach even being
made by one of its originators (Ikris 6), (Cheikes 3).
Another solution has been to develop a bridging mechanism, such as an
intermediary lexicon, that each context’s ontology can use to map and share
concepts (Park and Ram 598). This assumes that beneath the differing abstractions
is a standard reality — a single abstraction against which any ontology could be
matched and ‘translated’. The first problem is that this designates one particular
abstraction as the common standard; another is the assumption that this abstraction
can be a suitable bridge between any two contexts. Consider what sort of middle
space lies between the notions physical trauma and psychological trauma,
compared with the connection between physical trauma and news photography.
For an accurate transference of ideas, the middle ground depends on the specifics
of each case.
Other research, notably the 25-year Cyc project (Kanellopoulos 196), assumes
that a ‘federated’ approach is required — ‘federation’ being a combination of
multiple integrated ontologies. These ontological citizens are united using a single,
coherent framework, a meta-ontology. Unfortunately, both the Cyc and Semantic
Web approaches seem to be running into unbreachable barriers (Copeland 1).
The problem is simply that the rules behind the ontology that were designed to
simplify things, become too complex to code.
The assumption underlying all approaches is that one framework can produce
ontologies that can adequately capture anything in the universe, as well as being
usable by every feasible application. Yet, experience with working computer
systems indicates the opposite — that ontologies are the most supportive when
they are purpose built for a single domain. The limit is not the knowledge per se,
but the idea that there is a single knowledge-about-knowledge.
The Sheherazade group started by assuming that a context was more than a
subsection of a single ontology. Instead it is an enactment — a particular view, a
moment and mode of representation. Shifting between contexts not only means a
shift in what constitutes fact, but the way in which such assemblages cohere — the
terms of their terms. The domain of storytelling could offer this structure, if only
our research group knew how to characterise it. A story can contain numerous
perspectives, and even tales that share similar plot elements can convey different
meanings. An old story can be constantly remade, ‘clotting’ in new ways (Law
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138). To this behaviour, we added another consideration. We assumed that part
of our understanding of context depends on the fact that we know it can change
(Goranson and Cardier 2007). Important, previously unrepresented mechanisms
existed in the transition from one view to another. We needed to understand the
behind-the-scenes construction of stories, the activity of the storyteller.
It soon became clear that our group was dealing with two instances of the
same dynamic. The first would become the basis of a new approach to ontological
representation. The second was the interaction between members of our team.
As Law says, reflexivity about the contexts from which ideas are built is critical,
because ‘methods enact divisions’ (Law 153). As our collaboration progressed,
we drew increasingly from the ways in which we were coping with our own
disjunctive contexts. We could not rely on a generic middle ground, because
given the range of disciplines, there was none. We could not invent a general
standard reality and ask all members to conform to it, because everyone’s contextspecific knowledge would be lost. The strengths of the system would depend
on our ability to reason about how we were trying to reason, and transform our
knowledge into a new conceptual space.
*****
It started with the systems architect patiently teaching the writer about
computer systems. He made it clear that the writer had been brought into the
project because current scientific approaches could not do what he needed,
thus it would be a disaster if, in the process of learning computer science, her
writerly intuitions were trampled. To avoid this, the writer was taught scientific
modelling techniques as an extension of the research for her science fiction novel.
Years passed before it seemed as though she was discussing anything remotely
connected to computers.
The second risk concerned analogy. Any writerly principle could be arbitrarily
correlated to any aspect of systems architecture, because there was no ideal,
objectively correct relationship between creative writing and knowledge bases.
But it was still tempting to use the connections made by previous theorists, in
relation to unrelated projects. It emerged that the only reliable parameter that
could inform the linking of our contexts was the focus of application — in this
case, a context-sensitive reasoning system. Our specific, intended product would
gradually define the relations between our members’ expertise.
After a year, the writer realised that the area of computer science closest to her
concerns was knowledge representation. As she moved into this domain, her soft
intuitions were besieged from a new direction. When she mingled with computer
scientists, she encountered veterans, who were curious and asked her to get back
to them when she could demonstrate ideas in math, and she met rising stars, who
pointed out that her ideas did not belong. Principles that she had assumed to be
natural prickled with tension in their new surroundings. Sometimes she wondered
wonder whether they existed at all.
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By 2007, the writer understood enough about her relationship to computer
science to work with the rest of the team. She was flown to Boston, to spend
a month with graduates from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who
were hired to build the system. Even though she had been auditing programming
and logic classes for a year, she was afraid she had not yet learned enough to
communicate with this savvy crew. She did not know that her deficiencies of
language would not negatively affect the workshop. The whole team was about to
learn the importance of drawing on multiple contexts, in order to build a shared
mode of storytelling.
*****
Cohering Fragments
A storyteller begins by drawing together elements from a range of contexts. These
fragments exist at both the syntactic level of words and phrases, as well as the
conceptual level of images, themes and other already-established stories. As the
tale unfolds, a reader gradually learns how the incongruent pieces are likely to
be associated, how their relations are changing, and the terms on which change
can occur. Curiously, such formation is possible even when those associations are
unexpected, or their inferred contextual meanings conflict. Far from crashing into
incoherence, as would occur in a knowledge base that encountered the same sort
of discontinuity, the parts of the story that do not yet cohere can actually drive a
reader to consume more text, in the hope of discovering how the rogue pieces fit.
Once made, the story can be re-imagined, re-told or dismembered, so its parts can
be digested by new stories.
We needed to develop a context in which our research could occur. Here,
core principles from each of our fields would have meaning, although perhaps
not their usual meanings. The writer taught the group how stories were driven
by ambiguity and missing information; the computer scientists explained that
mathematics and logic work because they do not. We wondered how we would
ever get along. The writer needed to reach into another context, in order to flesh
the shape of her ideas. She needed an example.
She chose the fairytale Red Riding Hood. Theorist Sandra Beckett believes
this is ‘the most commented on fairy tale of all time’ (xv) and narratologists have
tracked the elements that most frequently re-occur (Orenstein 231). As a result of
the commonalities of plot and character in multiple versions of this tale, narrative
analysts sometimes share the attitude of Catherine Orenstein, who asserts that
‘like a change of wardrobe, motifs come and go without altering the body of tales’
(231). This is certainly one way to look at it. But in terms of our problem, this
narratological stance was similar to the assumption of the fixed ontology used in
computer science. It posited that it was possible for features to retain standard
meanings, no matter what context they appeared within.
The writer presented two versions of Red Riding Hood to the group. She wanted
to show how the process of storytelling could alter the meaning of particular
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features in different versions of the story — girl, wolf, grandmother, being eaten
— even though the characters and plot remained the same. She believed each
story enacted a unique ontology, simply by being told.
*****
Cause of Death
In order to establish a fixed point of reference, the writer focused on the same
concept in each Red Riding Hood example — death. This made it easier to
show that an identical concept in two stories could be used to convey different
meanings. She was particularly keen to show how the writers had constructed
specific conceptual spaces in order to produce those meanings. In each story, the
reasons for a character’s death were identified through the way its ontological
reality had been revealed.
The first story was Walter De la Mare’s Little Red Riding Hood, which was
written in 1927, towards the end of the economic boom known as the Roaring
Twenties (Osgerby 80). The defining characteristic of his child heroine is her
vanity. Vanity is established as significant from the outset, being responsible for
the most familiar aspect of the protagonist’s identity, her hood:
In the old days when countrywomen wore riding-hoods to keep themselves warm and
dry as they rode to market, there was a child living in a little village near the Low
Forest who was very vain. She was so vain she couldn’t even pass a puddle without
peeping down into it at her apple cheeks and yellow hair… Nothing pleased her better
than fine clothes, and when she was seven, having seen a strange woman riding by on
horseback, she suddenly had a violent longing for such a riding-hood as hers, and that
was of scarlet cloth with strings. (de la Mare 208)

This is the first information encountered by the reader. As such, vanity becomes
a term of meaning, informing the reader’s first view of the heroine’s activities,
attitudes and even the object associated with her name.
As the story progresses, the reader learns that vanity is not the girl’s only vice.
As she wanders through the forest, her mother’s sober warnings compete with
‘greedy thoughts of what she would have to eat at the end of her journey’ (de la
Mare 209). Vanity is a foundational concept, but with this inclusion of gluttony,
the terms are expanded to include both — vice. Forgetting her mother’s warning
‘not to lag or loiter in the Low Forest’ (de la Mare 209), Red Riding Hood falls
lazily asleep, thus adding sloth to her list of vices. Having confirmed that vice is
a concept with agency, the story then progresses through consequences on these
terms. When Red Riding Hood succumbs to sloth, her sleep creates a state of
vulnerability:
In her sleep she dreamed a voice was calling to her from very far away. It was a queer
husky voice, and seemed to be coming from some dark dismal place where the speaker
was hiding. At the sound of his voice calling and calling her ever more faintly, she
suddenly awoke, and there, no more than a few yards away, stood a Wolf, and he was
steadily looking at her. (de la Mare 211)
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At this stage of the story, the wolf begins to represent a form of punishment, a
consequence of virtue’s lapse. In other versions of this fairytale, the wolf signifies
other concepts — for example, in a medieval account of the myth, the wolf is
believed to represent ‘the violence of the infernal wolf, the Devil’ (Ziolkowski
117). In another version by the Brothers Grimm, he is a ‘seducer’ (Bettelheim
172). In de la Mare’s story, the wolf demonstrates that dealing in vice leaves one
open to the vice of others.
Just as the girl is subject to these terms, however, so is the wolf. The terms of
meaning are reinforced when the pattern repeats. The wolf indulges in gluttony,
eating both grandma and the girl. As with Red Riding Hood, the wolf’s own vice
leaves him vulnerable to death:
Nevertheless, that cunning greedy crafty old Wolf had not been cunning enough. He
had bolted down such a meal that the old glutton at once went off to sleep on the bed
… And he had forgotten to shut the door. (de la Mare 214)

Indulgence of vice again leads to a vulnerable sleep, and the hunter enters to slay
the wolf. The role of the wolf now shifts from punisher to punished:
‘Oho! You old ruffian,’ [the woodman] cried softly, ‘is it you?’
At this far-away strange sound in his dreams, the Wolf opened — though by scarcely
more than a hair’s breadth — his dull, drowsy eyes. But at a glimpse of the woodman,
his wits came instantly back to him, and he knew his danger. Too late!
(de la Mare 214)

By the end of the story, its terms are settled. The ontological parameters are that
vice leads to excess, which can cause an unknowing sleep, which in turn results
in death. It is interesting to note that even though grandma is not portrayed as
having vice, and is eaten, the terms of the story remain consistent. As the reader
learns of her demise, they are simultaneously assured that grannie’s ‘death’ is
only temporary, with the parenthetical ‘for a while’: ‘[t]he door came open and in
he went; and that (for a while) was the end of grannie’ (de la Mare 191).
Sure enough, Grannie is later rescued, along with Red Riding Hood, who has
now learned not to indulge in vice (de la Mare 193). Meaning is built by the ways
concepts are associated with each other. These meanings are primed by the causal
consequences established by the tales’ unfolding, and the terms on which these
events occur.
Compare the above ontological parameters to those of Red Riding Hood as a
Dictator Would Tell It, by H.I. Philips. This version was written in 1940, in the
United States, before the country entered the Second World War. In the title alone,
two commonly known contexts are juxtaposed — generic images of Red Riding
Hood and general notions of dictators. Such a deliberate initial assembly alerts
the reader that juxtaposition might be a term of meaning. The first few sentences
of the story build imagery to support this, with the wolf’s sensitive qualities being
so emphasised as to seem laboured:
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Once upon a time there was a poor, weak wolf. It was gentle and kindly and had a heart
of gold. It loved everybody and felt very sad when it looked around and saw so much
deceit, selfishness, strife, treachery and cunning on the loose. All it wanted was to be
let alone. (Phillips 230)

Given the title’s suggestion that this tale is an interpretation, the characterisation
of the wolf as kind can be read from two different perspectives. If the narrator is
telling the truth, the meaning of this story will be an inversion of the traditional
Red Riding Hood, in which the wolf is usually devious. If the narrator is not
telling the truth, the nature of the situation can only be deduced if the meanings
of his words are re-interpreted. This extends the term of meaning, ‘juxtaposed
contexts’, to the possibility that deception about one context is being enacted by
another.
As the tale progresses, the notion of juxtaposed contexts is reinforced. Another
description follows in which other role reversals are apparent, this time in relation
to Red Riding Hood and Grandma:
Now in a cottage on the edge of the forest there lived a little girl who went by the name
of Red Riding Hood… The kid was not to be trusted an inch. She was a rattlesnake, a
viper and an imperialist… Grandma was a louse too! (Phillips 230)

Tension is created by continuing discrepancies between stated and inferred
versions of the tale. Other clues, such as inconsistencies of narrative voice and
the fact that the narrator’s scope is limited, reinforce these terms of meaning.
The first death — that of grandma — is used to define the conflicting
relationship between inferred and explicit contexts. The reader learns that she
dies, and through this recounting, it becomes clear that narrator is concealing
information:
When the wolf walked he liked to think things over... This took a lot of concentrating
and when he was concentrating the wolf sometimes got lost in thought and didn’t know
what he was doing. Suddenly, and before he knew what was what, he found himself not
only in Grandma’s cottage but in her bedroom! He had kicked down the door. Grandma
was pretty startled and demanded, ‘What is the meaning of this?’ ‘I am repulsing an
invasion,’ the wolf explained, scorning all subterfuge. Grandma was an aggressor, that
was clear. So the Wolf ate her up. (Phillips 231)

With the last six lines, it is revealed that the causal association in the narrator’s
explicit account is flawed. If the grandmother is ‘an aggressor’ it seems
inconsistent that she also be represented as ‘startled’. This instils doubt in the
narrator’s trustworthiness, and reinforces the possibility that he is lying. Even
though the narrator explicitly associates himself with gentle qualities, the
combined inferences indicate aggressive behaviour. As the story progresses to its
resolution, it confirms that all explicit statements must be transformed onto these
terms of dictator manipulation, in order to determine their meaning. Its series of
deaths establishes the ontological parameters to be: viewing the world in multiple
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ways leads to comparing versions which provides an informed perspective and
makes justice possible.
*****
Through this analysis, the writer first articulated the way a story builds a
specific ontological scope. The interaction between informational elements,
as they progressively appear, build terms on which naming and assembly are
conveyed. The next day, two of the computer scientists arrived with a way to
represent this. It was the first moment one of the writer’s ideas had found footing
in their world.
The computer scientists had drawn concepts as nodes and links. The writer
could do this too. She reinterpreted more of the 1927 version of the story using this
method, and soon discovered it would be fairly easy to depict what she knew this
way. The group’s focus then shifted to the 1940 version, because it was harder.
Most of the information critical to the meaning of Red Riding Hood as a
Dictator Would Tell It is not explicit. Instead the meanings depend on external
contextual relations — a knowledge of dictators, of conventional tellings of
Red Riding Hood, and
even the fact that the
story was written at a
particular time. It also
leverages
multiple,
changing
meanings.
When the writer tried
to map this version, the
next problem arose.
Too much was
changing. She could
not keep track of
all the concepts. In
order to record every
Fig. 2. Our team’s first formal representation of story ontology
semantic negotiation,
she needed to leave enough drawing space on the page to include it. But there
was so much renegotiation in this story that a new slice of paper was required
for every sentence. With each step forward through the text, there was another
fragment of information that did not fit, and she had to start drawing again. It was
as though she had to know every structure that might surface in the story before
commencing the representation. The urge to create a fixed ontology was creeping
back into our modelling, along with the attendant problems.
The writer tried multiple sheets of paper, then experimented with sticking
clear plastic film over existing diagrams. She considered constructing a threedimensional installation artwork to capture this Red Riding Hood’s ontology.
Eventually the writer realised that her problem was, in fact, part of the model. It
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Fig. 3: Our animated ontology identifies a similarity between the terms in the story Red Riding Hood
as a Dictator Would Tell It and those in the traditional fairy tale.

was not sufficient to make a system that anticipated every kind of structure that
would appear — this was already understood. Our knowledge base would need
ways to solve the problem the writer was drowning in. The ontology had to be
able to move. There was another ontology behind it, related to assembly.
In fact, the writer didn’t realise this until it coincided with a practical
consideration. She was tired of redrawing the same picture on dozens of sheets
of paper. She switched to the presentation program Keynote to save time. As
Keynote provides progressive slides, it has a capacity for animation. Moving
pictures offered an extra dimension of organisation — time. Because time-based
unfolding was one of the issues at stake, this solved the initial problem the writer
had been fighting.
Figures 3 and 4 show two consecutive slides from our approach to ontological
representation. The ‘bands’ along the top are the inferred, reference contexts.
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Fig. 4: A discrepancy is identified between some of the structures that have been matched in the
example story and the fairy tale.

The band at the bottom is the space in which this particular story’s ontology is
assembled as the tale progresses. When text streams in, coloured boxes group
concepts that are associated. Every time another part of the text appears, ‘funnels’
show how aspects of previous concepts are transferred. Finally, shapes that are
coloured purple show when a conflict between concepts requires ontological
rearrangement, in order to restore enough coherence to continue. All the links
change over time, which can be represented as the slides progress.
We were ready to start collaborating on a system. The writer’s keynote drawings
provided a shared way to discuss it, one accessible to all of us. After four years of
informal discussion and three years of funded collaboration, we were now at the
point at which most system design begins, in which the programming team could
design code to support it. But we were also far ahead of the beginning, having had
an embodied experience of the process we wanted to model. The effort of making
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a ‘two-way conversation’ (Kapoor 642) had become such a significant part of our
work that it provided the foundation for the product’s eventual shape.
*****
What methodology can be used, in order to make a collaborative story,
when different cultures are participating? Spivak suggests that an exchange of
knowledges should start with an assumption of re-learning, and the attitude:
I need to learn from you what you practice, I need it even if you didn’t want to share
a bit of my pie; but there is something I want to give you, which will make our shared
practice flourish. (Spivak 2000 16)

Instead of relying on established theories about the relationship between our
domains, we depended on a strong engagement with each other, as well as a
connection to a specific target context — the intended product. We wanted to
design a knowledge base ontology that could cope with contextual transference
and change. The principles that survived from each field were those that resonated
in multiple spaces, including the reflective space, in which we understood the
construction of our method in relation to the desired outcome. Ideas developed
currency in relation to the confused looks on each other’s faces, and also in
conjunction with the target product, only surviving if they were able to find new
footing in both areas. We changed our words as we spoke, so that our languages
grew towards each other, learning fresh affordances from the interaction. Through
these incremental adjustments, new representations and contexts emerged from
the desire to connect, and eventually cohered in unexpected ways. We discovered
that building terms, and the stories that rest on them, is a dynamic process.
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